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NATIONAL DISCRETION: CHOOSING
COCOM'S SUCCESSOR AND THE NEW
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT
Philip H. Oettinger"

INTRODUCTION
The demise of communism in the former Soviet Union' and Eastern
Europe2 has enlarged significantly the number of business opportunities
available to U.S. companies. Since World War II, the Coordinating

Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom or Coordinating
Committee)3 has regulated the -flow of "strategic goods and technolo-

gy"4 to the countries aligned with the former Soviet Union. The Coor* J.D. Candidate, May 1994, Washington College of Law, The American University.
This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Peter and Marlys Oettinger, for their confidence
in me over the years. The author also wishes to thank Michelle Sue Miyake for her tireless
editing efforts in seeing this piece, as well as many others, to completion.
1. See The Cocom Cooperation Forum on Export Controls is Meeting Today in
Paris, What Can We Say?, E.B. Press Guidance, Nov. 23, 1992 (on file with The
American University Journal of International Law & Policy) (defining the former
Soviet Union as the New Independent States, including: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan).
2. See id. (defining the former Eastern European communist countries as Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania).
3. See Richard T. Cupitt, The Future of CoCom. in EXPORT CONTROLS IN
TRANSITION 232, 233-35 (Gary K. Bertsch & Steven Elliott-Gower eds., 1992) (noting
that the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom or Coordinating Committee) consisted of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States); Stephen
D. Kelly, Curbing Illegal Transfers of Foreign-Developed Critical High Technology
from CoCom Nations to the Soviet Union: An Analysis of the Toshiba-Kongsberg Incident, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 183, 183 n.6 (1989) (identifying CoCom as
an international organization comprised of Western nations that seek to regulate the
exchange of critical technology).
4. See Cecil Hunt, Multilateral Cooperation in Export Controls-The Role of,
CoCom, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1285, 1287-88 (1983) (defining "strategic goods and
technology" as items that significantly contribute to the military capability of pro-
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dinating Committee members created CoCom after World War II to
protect themselves from the threat of communism.' CoCom's purpose
was to maintain a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) edge in
defense technology to counterbalance the Warsaw Pact countries' superior conventional military forces.6 To maximize the number of CoCom
members, the framers designed it as an informal agreement containing
only weak enforcement mechanisms.'
CoCom generally succeeded in limiting the flow of sensitive technology to the East.' Soviet-initiated "false flag" or "front" operations illus-

scribed destination countries and adversely affect the security of member states).
5. See Gary K. Bertsch & Steven Elliott-Gower, Introduction, to EXPORT CONTROLS IN TRANSITION, supra note 3, at 1 (discussing the formation of CoCom as a
response to the Cold War and as a way to delay communist acquisition of advanced
military goods and technology).
6. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 188 (stating that the United States relied on the
creation of a technological edge over the former Soviet Union to ensure national
security and to develop a plan for military policy); Daniel J. Fitzpatrick, Of Ropes,
Buttons, and Four-By-Fours: Import Sanctions for Violations of the CoCom Agreement, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 249, 252-53 (1988) (noting that since the initiation of the
Cold War the former Soviet Union's conventional forces significantly outnumbered
those of the West). For this reason, the West has relied on a slight advantage in
technology to guarantee national security. Id. The former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, however, consistently tried to overcome this technological superiority through
commercial trade and espionage. Id.
7. See Wende A. Wrubel, Comment, The Toshiba-Kongsberg Incident: Shortcomings of CoCom, and Recommendations for Increased Effectiveness of Export Controls
to the East Bloc, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 241, 253 (1989) (criticizing CoCom
enforcement mechanisms as insufficient to prevent the former Soviet Union from
acquiring Western technology and explaining the basis for gentlemen's agreements).
States form gentlemen's agreements when they impose moral or political commitments
rather than legal ones. Id. at 246 n.20. Under this type of agreement, parties assume
voluntary commitments to refrain from performing certain acts or commit to performing others. Id. The parties to such an agreement expect each other to abide by the
commitment without formally binding themselves to enforce violations. Id. As an
example of a gentlemen's agreement, CoCom regulations lacked strong enforcement
measures and therefore were easy to avoid. Id. at 252. The enforcement mechanisms
mandated by CoCom consist chiefly of an Import Certificate/Delivery Verification
(IC/DV) system and an "end user check." Id. at 253; see infra Part I (explaining the
mechanics behind the IC/DV system and describing how an end user check functions).
By requiring an exporter to obtain IC/DV documents, CoCom members hoped that the
importing country's government would be better able to detect diversion. Hunt, supra
note 4, at 1294. In addition to the ICDV system, another enforcement mechanism involved sharing information on the illegal diversion of goods to proscribed countries.
Id.
8. See Bertsch & Elliott-Gower, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that the CoCom
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trate the success of CoCom in controlling exports directly to prohibited
countries.9 This general success, however, cannot be attributed to the
equal efforts of all CoCom members. The export control system employed by the United States was much more stringent than those employed by other CoCom members.' As a result, U.S. businesses paid a
disproportionate price in the Cold War effort to safeguard the West's
sensitive technology."

system helped to maintain a technological lead in the West). The West is estimated
to be 10 years ahead of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in computer
technology. Id. 10 CoMM. DAILY 5, May 16, 1990, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File (concluding that CoCom rules successfully limited the amount
of high technology that leaked through to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe).
9. See James Plousadis, Soviet Diversion of United States Technology: The Circumvention of CoCom and United States Reexport Controls, and Proposed Solutions, 7
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 561, 565 (1984) (defining "false flag" or "front" operations as
the establishment of dummy businesses primarily in Japan and Western Europe for the
purpose of diverting Western technology to communist countries). As soon as the
front company successfully obtained the goods, it exported them to the former Soviet
Union and its former Warsaw Pact allies. Id. In 1982 and 1983, the former Soviet
Union diverted Digital Equipment Corporation's VAX 11n82 computer and the
Perkin-Elmer Micralign 200's. Id. Although the former Soviet Union shipped the VAX
11n82 to Sweden from New York, via South Africa and West Germany, Swedish
and West German authorities intercepted it upon U.S. detection. Id. Regarding the
Micralign 200, two U.S.-made microcircuitry machines were sold to a Swiss company,
Favag, S.A., which subsequently sold them to another Swiss company. Id. Upon final
shipment to Paris, the machines disappeared, and authorities now believe the Soviets
have possession of them. Id.
10. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 282 n.185 (comparing the U.S. export controls system to that of other former CoCom members and concluding that a lack of
surveillance on the sale of goods and technology to third party countries has resulted
in U.S. reexport controls). See also Susan F. Rasky, What is Good for Security May
be Bad for Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1987, at 5 (concluding that the United
States assesses technology transfers with more scrutiny than other former CoCom
members). The danger to U.S. businesses is that many countries will "design out"
(Le., deliberately not plan to use) U.S. products when they can acquire similar products elsewhere with fewer problems, even if the cost is higher. Id.
11. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING
AND INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FINDING COMMON GROUND 166 (1991) (advocating the

harmonization of export control lists and enforcement among former CoCom members
to level the playing field for U.S. businesses that have long operated at a competitive
disadvantage); U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Exports: Strategic
Technology Controls, GIST, June 17, 1992 (asserting that former CoCom countries
should cooperate in three major areas: 1) publishing national control lists of embargoed equipment and enacting effective export control systems; 2) considering proposed
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Since the demise of communism in the former Soviet Union and
Eastern European countries, the export control system has changed rapidly.' 2 CoCom members dissolved the organization at the end of March
1994."3 The successor regime to CoCom will focus on preventing arms
exports of specific embargoed items from member countries to proscribed countries;
and 3) harmonizing national licensing practices for strategic exports and coordinating
export control enforcement activities); DAVID J. RICHARDSON, SIZING UP U.S. EXPORT
DISINCENTIVES 125-32 (1993) (estimating the cost of export controls at $10 to $20
billion and the loss of jobs at 200,000 to 400,000).
12. See Gary Milhollin, A Look at Selling Self-Destruction: The Perils of Perry
& Co., WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1994, at C3 (discussing the change in position within
the Department of Defense (Defense Department) on dual-use controls). Under Presidents Reagan and Bush, export control proponents could rely on the Defense Department to support controls on dual-use technology. Id. Presently, however, the Clinton
administration's Secretary of Defense, William Perry, views export controls as ineffective in controlling the transfer of dual-use technology. Id. While maintaining controls on the transfer of military goods and technology, the Defense Department has
launched a counter-proliferation initiative. Id. A counter-proliferatibn policy focuses on
high technology responses to situations where proliferation already has occurred, instead of attempting to prevent it through the use of diplomacy and export controls.
Id.
Compare TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COMMITTEE, TOWARD A NATIONAL
EXPORT STRATEGY: REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS, Sept. 30, 1993, at 57 (identifying the threshold for exports of computers to most destinations at 12.5 Millions of
Theoretical Operations per Second (MTOPS) and that for supercomputers at 195
MTOPS) with Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary
Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 11-12 (Feb. 24, 1994) [hereinafter EAA Hearings 2] (statement of Barry Carter,
Acting Undersecretary for the Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce (Commerce Department)) (announcing a rule that will raise the threshold level
to 1,000 MTOPS for computers to most destinations and 1,500 MTOPS for
supercomputers). Computers and electronics comprise 69% of U.S. export licenses.
TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra, at 58 (representing that in
fiscal year 1993, computer and electronic licenses were worth $40 billion of a total
export license value of $58 billion).
13. Export Controls, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Jan. 31, 1994, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Export Controls] (stating that the
dramatic changes in world politics mandate the reexamination of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) and CoCom); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (Feb. 3, 1994) [hereinafter EAA Hearings 1]
(statement of Christopher A. Padilla, Chairman of the Export Controls Working Group
of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM)) (emphasizing that without export
control reform, CoCom may dissolve into a system of nationally regulated unilateral
controls); U.S. Ends Cold War Controls on Telecommunications, 14 COMM. DAILY 3,
Apr. 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File (reporting on the
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and nuclear proliferation. 4 CoCom's successor will not have a static
list of target countries" and will rely primarily on the discretion of
each nation in controlling exports to "rogue states."' 6 Because the United States maintains the most stringent export control system, however,
leaving export controls to national discretion risks the danger that U.S.
businesses will continue to pay a disproportionate price of efforts to
prevent arms and nuclear proliferation. 7 This fear has led U.S. businesses to propose their version of a new Export Administration Act
(new EAA) to help ensure that they no longer will have to compete at a
disadvantage. 8
Part I of this Comment describes the history of the CoCom system.
Part II establishes the framework for the domestic export control system
under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA or current EAA). 9

disbanding of CoCom and the elimination of export controls on telecommunications
and computer equipment to China, Russia, and other former communist countries).
14. See Export Controls: U.S. Allies Still at Odds over Details of New PostCoCom Regime, Official Says, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Feb. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter U.S. Allies Still at Odds] (reporting that at a meeting during November 1993, at the Hague, U.S. allies agreed to create a new organization that would prohibit the sale of sensitive dual-use items and
armaments to countries of serious concern); U.S. Allies Agree to Work to Set Up
Post-CoCom Export Regime by October, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Apr. 1, 1994,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File (reporting on former CoCom
member plans to establish a new regime by the fall of 1994).
15. See U.S. Allies Still at Odds, supra note 14 (noting that the replacement
organization will focus on the behavior of suspect states rather than on a permanent
set of enemies).
16. See Lally Weymouth, Good News for Rogue States, WASH. PoST, Feb. 4,
1994, at A19 (listing the "rogue states" as Iran, North Korea and Syria); U.S. Allies
Still at Odds, supra note 14 (listing the current target countries as Iran, Iraq, Libya,
and North Korea).
17. See EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2 (testimony of Dr. Paul
Freedenburg, International Trade Consultant for Baker and Botts, L.L.P.) (stating that
under a system of national discretion, U.S. unilateral controls may cost companies
market share while allowing proscribed end users to obtain goods elsewhere).
18. See H.R. 3412, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) (stating that the proposed recommendations include: multilateral consensus on a core list of proscribed items; a
sunset provision for unilateral controls; a license-free zone for new regime members;
stronger and broader foreign availability provisions; agency consolidation; a faster
,licensing process; and judicial review).
19. The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat.
503 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420
(1988)). Additional export restrictions are provided by the Trading With the Enemy
Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1988), the International Emergency Economic
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Part III analyzes the success CoCom had in controlling the export of
sensitive technology to proscribed countries by reviewing three case
studies-the Toshiba-Kongsberg incident,2" the availability of prohibited
products in the Cyril Bath case,2' and the sale of prohibited products to
aid Iraqi military development.22 Despite CoCom's success, Part I
demonstrates that CoCom has had greater impact on regulation in the
United States than in Europe or Japan, at a higher cost to U.S. business-

Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 22
U.S.C. §§ 3201-3282 (1988), the Development and Control of Atomic Energy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988), and the Promotion of Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
4001-4053 (1988).
20. See Beverly Crawford, Changing Export Controls in an Interdependent World:
Lessons from the Toshiba Case for the 1990s, in EXPORT CONTROLS IN TRANsITtON,
supra note 3, at 249, 264-78 (stating that the Toshiba case involved the sale of computerized milling machines to the former Soviet Union by Toshiba Machine Company
of Japan); infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Toshiba incident).
21. See Wrubel, supra note 7, at 252 n.62 (indicating that this case highlights
the inadequacies of CoCom); infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text (describing
the lost sale of metal-forming presses by Cyril Bath Co. to ABC-Loire due to different levels of domestic CoCom regulation enforcement).
22. KENNETH R. TIMMERMAN, THE DEATH LOBBY 32 (1991). French products
sold to Iraq include Armat, Exocet, HOT, Magic, Martel, and Milan missiles;
Alouette, Gazelle, and Super Puma helicopters; Tiger G radar; AMX 30-GCT howitzers; and a reactor capable of making nuclear bombs. Id. British companies aided the
Iraqi airforce with sales of high-level security systems, microwave transmitters, and
military training. Id. at 340-41. West German companies contributed heavily to Iraq's
chemical weapons development by building state-of-the-art pesticide plants that were
later used for the production of poisonous gas. Id. at 147. In addition, German companies exported an estimated 20 tons of potassium hydrogen fluoride, 1,000 tons of
thionyl chloride, 60 tons of phosphorus oxychloride, 150 tons of isopropyl alcohol,
and 5 tons of hydrogen fluoride, all of which were assumed to have been used in the
"pesticide" plants to create poisonous gas. Id. at 148.
In addition to sales by British, French, and West German companies, U.S.
companies also- aided Iraq in its military development. U.S. Government Controls on
Sales to Iraq: Hearings Before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8
(1990) [hereinafter Iraqi Hearings] (statement of Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Control). To assess the total level of aid given to Iraq in
developing its defensive capability, experts must include indirect sales to Iraq. Id.
Indirect sales occur when U.S. companies sell to countries that later resell "those products to Iraq. Id. For example, a U.S.s company exported seven large rocket casings
from Chicago to Brazil in 1990 to help build Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs). Id. All Brazilian-made rockets, however, were converted into missiles and
sold to Iraq or Libya. Id. This conversion benefitted Iraq's space programs, including
missiles targeted at U.S. troops. Id.
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es.2 Part IV proposes a model for the multilateral export control regime under CoCom's successor. Part V reviews two bills currently pending before Congress, H.R. 3412 and S. 1902, that will form the basis of
the new EAA. Part VI concludes that Congress not only should pursue
multilateral consensus on the prohibition of certain goods and technology to rogue states, but also should maintain the availability of unilateral
controls while reforming the national licensing process.24
I. HISTORY OF MULTILATERAL CONTROLS UNDER COCOM
After the conclusion of World War II, the United States and its
NATO allies recognized the need to prohibit the transfer of strategic
goods and technology to communist countries to ensure national security.' On January 1, 1950, Western allies signed an agreement to develop a set of regulations to govern the flow of high technology to communist countries." This agreement resulted in the creation of

23. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 11, at 18-20 (noting that
the major areas affecting U.S. businesses are unilateralism, a lack of selectivity in
developing and managing control lists, and a lack of fairness and efficiency in the
U.S. export control process). The study also examined the effect of export controls on
specific U.S. industrial sectors, including advanced materials, commercial aircraft and
jet engines, and computers. Id. at 20-25. The findings of the study include the suffocating effect of unilateral controls on U.S. commerce and the detrimental effect export
controls have on initial outlays for research and development (R&D). Id. at 21.
24. The scope of this Comment will not include an examination of controls for
the following: chemical weapons instituted by the Australia Group; missiles required
by the Missile Technology Control Regime; or nuclear materials handled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
25. Wrubel, supra note 7, at 244. See Hunt, supra note 4, at 1286-87 (discussing
the initiation of the export control system as beginning with a Consultative Group
consisting of export officials from Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). The members of the Consultative Group created
CoCom concurrently to deal, unlike the Consultative Group, with export controls on a
daily basis. Id. Within a few years, the policy level Consultative Group ceased to
meet, and CoCom emerged as an organization that supervised export controls on both
an administrative and policy making level. Id.
26. Wrubel, supra note 7, at 245. To strengthen CoCom, Congress passed sanctions called the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act), 22
U.S.C. §§ 1611-1613 (1951), superseded by the Export Administration Act of 1979.
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988). Id. The Battle Act refused U.S. aid to countries
not complying with the prohibitions on the transfer of strategic goods and technology
to communist nations. Id. at 245 n.15. See Joseph Edward Gregory, Controlling the
Transfer of Militarily Significant Technology: CoCom After Toshiba, 11 FoRDHAM
INT'L L.J. 863, 870 (1988) (explaining that the problem with the Battle Act was that

566

AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 9:2

CoCom, 27

an informal body that was responsible for overseeing the
administration of export controls to which member countries agreed
unanimously.28
Based in Paris, CoCom was comprised of representatives from each of
the member countries. 29 Its main objective was to formulate an embargo policy to restrict the export of products and technology that would
enhance significantly the military capabilities of the communist countries.30 CoCom accomplished its objective by maintaining a series of

its influence was short-lived). As European nations moved towards economic selfsufficiency, the influence that the United States had over their export controls decreased. Id. at 870 n.60. No longer could the United States use economic aid as a
bargaining chip to ensure that nations abided by CoCom regulations. Id.
27. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 251 n.9 (noting that the North- Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) members established CoCom in secrecy and that it is
therefore unlikely that any formal agreement was written). The statute establishing
U.S. participation in CoCom is 50 U.S.C. § 2404(i) (1988), which urges the President
to negotiate with Coordinating Committee members. Id.
28. U.S. Exports: Strategic Technology Controls, supra note 11, at 1. CoCom
worked as an informal agreement that was not based on any executive agreement or
treaty. Id. Members voted and took action only upon unanimous agreement. Id. See
Plousadis. supra note 9, at 589-90 (indicating that many proponents of reform have
argued that the members of CoCom should have elevated it to treaty level to provide
for greater enforcement). Contra Interview with the Director of CoCom Affairs, of the
State Department, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 6, 1993). Some experts say that the very
strength of CoCom was its ability to exist as an informal agreement and still achieve,
to a high degree, its stated objectives. Id. A formal process might have discouraged
new members from joining and encouraged existing members to leave when the costs
of membership outweighed the benefits provided. Id.
29. See CoCom to List Products that Need Licenses for Export, COMPUTERGRAM
INT'L, May 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File (stating
that CoCom operated out of the U.S. Embassy in Paris); Watanabe Says Japan Wants
to Coordinate New Arms Regime, Japan Econ. Newswire, Feb. 27, 1992, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File (indicating that the U.S. Embassy in Paris
served as the contact point for CoCom).
30. See Hunt, supra note 4, at 1288 (commenting on the offensive use of
CoCom as a policy of economic warfare against the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe at the height of the Cold War). Id. CoCom initially imposed embargoes on
both basic industrial and military goods, subscribing to the belief that basic industrial
goods would support an economic base from which a powerful military state could
emerge. Id. CoCom policy reflected a gradual evolution towards selectively controlling
the transfer of technology that had potential military application. Id. By delaying
communist acquisition of advanced technology, the West preserved a technological gap
and retained a lead-time on strategic goods and technology. Id. The United States
Government has characterized strategic goods and technology as those products from
which communist countries might extract technology of military significance; those
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prohibited export lists: an International Atomic Energy List; an International Munitions List; and an International List of Dual-Use Items
(Dual-Use List).31 The Dual-Use List generated the most controversy
because it prohibited the export of items that have civilian applications
due to the possibility of military use.32 In addition to formulating an
embargo policy on certain products, CoCom representatives met weekly
to consider exceptions to its prohibitions.33 If verification of civilian

products of military significance where there exists a deficiency in the proscribed
destinations; and those products used in peacetime for the production, development,
and use of arms. Id.
31. See Hunt, supra note 4, at 1288-91 (noting that the International Dual-Use
List included dual-use items not present on either of the two other lists). The domestic equivalent of the CoCom List of Dual-Use Items, with additional items, was the
Commerce Control List. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (Supp. No. 1) (1993). Similarly, the U.S.
Munitions List roughly corresponded to the International Munitions List. Id. § 770
(Supp. No. 2) (1993). Critics of the export control process have pointed to disparities
between the CoCom and domestic lists that allowed foreign companies to supply
products prohibited by U.S. controls to communist countries. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, supra note 11, at 172. To differentiate between CoCom regulations and
U.S. imposed unilateral controls, the Commerce and Defense Departments designated
CoCom regulations with national security implications as "NS". 15 C.F.R. § 799.1
(Supp. No. 1) (1993). Items proscribed for foreign policy reasons had a "FP" designation. Id.
32. See Christopher K. Davis, Export Controls: New CoCom Measures on High-

Technology Exports. 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 547, 548 (1988) (stating that the United
States received little cooperation in its effort to tighten export controls from Western
European countries, because they viewed trade with the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe as economically beneficial and not as destructive to national security
interests); Rasky, supra note 10, at 5 (quoting a German diplomat as saying that the
Pentagon. in prohibiting U.S. exporters from selling many dual-use goods, had exceeded what was realistically enforceable). The controversy over dual-use items is best
illustrated by the following example. Rasky, supra note 10, at 5. Consider a $10,000
music synthesizer containing a $500 computer disk drive. Id. The prevailing position
in the United States Government is that the Commerce Department should prohibit the
sale of the synthesizer to the Soviet Union because selling the disk drive is prohibited. Id. Because the Soviets could remove the computerized part, the product, by
Defense Department standards, would have a clear military application. Id. Some former CoCom members question prohibiting the sale, claiming that communist countries
would not bother buying a product to extract one-twentieth of its value. Id.
33. Hunt, supra note 4, at 1292-94. Exception requests became fairly numerous
in the last couple of years of CoCom. Id. In the 1970s, CoCom exceptions were
valued at less than 1% of total products exported from CoCom countries to controlled
destinations. Id. From 1970 to 1978, that figure substantially increased to roughly
1,000 exception cases, the value of which was estimated at $200 million. Id. On
average, *the United States submitted about half of all exception cases and CoCom
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"end use"' existed, CoCom could agree to waive the generally applicable restrictions for a particular transaction.35
A common method for assuring that dual-use products were not diverted to communist countries was through the Import Certificate/Delivery Verification (IC/DV) system.36 Under the IC/DV system,
CoCom required the importer's government to issue a delivery verification statement and an import statement assuring that the importer would
receive the product and would not reexport it without the prior approval
of the appropriate officers of the importer's government.37 Another accepted method for ensuring the non-military use of dual-use items included an "end user check," whereby the recipients of the product declared its intended end use and pledged that they would not illegally
divert or reexport the item to a proscribed country.3" CoCom officials
had the discretion to accept any of these guarantees in determining
whether they should grant an exception and also could take into consideration other economic, military, or political factors.39

denied 2% to 4% of all requests. Id.
34. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. supra note 11, at 357 (defining "end
use" as the application or purpose for which a purchaser will use technical data or
controlled commodities).
35. Hunt, supra note 4, at 1292-94. Delay in evaluating CoCom exception requests proved a significant problem, and the main offender was the United States. Id.
The delay in processing created tension between the United States and other CoCom
members who suspected a deliberate U.S. ploy to gain commercial advantage for U.S.
businesses. Id. Other countries claimed that the delay was due to the cumbersome
review process of the U.S. export control system. Id. The latter problem was the
more likely explanation. Id.
Congress imposed processing deadlines by statute in 1979, but these deadlines
only applied to export license applications under the EAA and, therefore, were not
relevant for purposes of evaluating another country's exception request. Id. at 1293 &
1293 n.33. In recent years, good faith efforts to accelerate the evaluation by the United States of requests submitted by other Cocom members improved performance and
relations. Id.
36. Hunt. supra note 4, at 1294. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing the policy behind the IC/DV mechanism as a means of enforcing CoCom
restrictions).
37. Hunt, supra note 4, at 1294.
38. Wrubel, supra note 7, at 253.
39. Hunt, supra note 4, at 1291. An exporter initiated the process of exception
evaluations by filing an application for a validated license with the Commerce
Department's Bureau of Export Administration (BXA). Id. at 1292. Within 10 days,
the BXA informed the applicant as to whether the exporter had to submit an application to a multilateral review process. Id. The application was first reviewed by the
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II. THE DOMESTIC EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM UNDER THE
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979 (AS AMENDED)
The United States regulates its exports pursuant to the general provisions of the EAA, as amended by the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985.40 Under the current EAA, the, President has the
power to prohibit the export of certain products for foreign policy or national security reasons.41 The President, however, rarely exercises this
authority. Instead, the Secretary of Commerce utilizes executive power
to require licenses for most exports.4' To implement the EAA, Export

United States Government. which decided whether it should deny the application
based on national discretion. Id. If there was no basis for domestic denial, BXA
forwarded the application to CoCom with the U.S. request for an exception and an
explanation as to why CoCom should grant it. Id.' CoCom usually decided on the
request within 18 days, but in the absence of a decision CoCom could extend its
evaluation period for two weeks. Id. An exception to CoCom. regulations required a
unanimous decision. Id.
40. The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985 (EAAA), Pub. L. No.
99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. app. §§
2401-2420 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). See Peter S. Malloy, Controls on the Export of
Militarily Sensitive Technology: National Security Imperative or U.S. Industry Impediment, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 841, 852-53 (1992) (describing the major changes the EAAA made to the EAA). The EAAA allows companies to export
goods that previously required a validated license to controlled countries without such
a license if the former CoCom members do not prohibit the transaction. Id. The
EAAA also allows for exports to non-CoCom nations if they enter into an agreement
with the United States on terms similar to those it has with former CoCom members.
Id. The final major change concerned a shift in the burden of proof for a foreign
availability showing. Id. Whereas the EAA required direct evidence of foreign availability, the EAAA requires the Commerce Department to accept a written representation of foreign availability supported by reasonable proof, unless the Commerce Department shows sufficient evidence to the contrary. Id.; see infra notes 52-56 and
accompanying text (describing the concept of foreign availability).
41. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404(a), 2405(a) (1988). These sections of the statute provide authority such that:
[I]n order to carry out the policy set forth . . . the President may, in accordance with the provisions of this section, prohibit or curtail the export of any
goods or technology subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or exported
by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States .
Id.
42. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 198, 198 n.122 (stating that the Secretary of
Commerce exercises executive power granted by 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2403(a), (e),
2409(a), to require either a general or validated license for the export of goods). See
generally EVAN R. BERLACK ET AL., COPING wITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 39-57
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Administration Regulations (EAR) require the Department of Commerce
(Commerce Department) and the Department of Defense (Defense Department) to generate control lists of products prohibited from export to
proscribed countries.43 The Defense Department maintains a list entitled

(1988) (discussing general and validated licensing procedures). A general license involves the broad grant of authority by the Commerce Department for certain products
to all exporters and to all or most destinations. lain S. Baird, Export Licensing from
"A" to "Z", 109 Bus. AM. 12, 12-13 (1988). Most U.S. exports are shipped using
general licenses and an application is not required for their use. Id. at 13. Goods requiring general licenses include such items as goods imported for display at U.S.
exhibitions or trade fairs; shipments of particular non-Naval petroleum commodities;
and certain technical data. Id.
A validated license is defined as a specific grant of authority to a particular
exporter from the Commerce Department for the purpose of exporting a good to a
specific destination. Id. Generally, validated license applications are good for two
years and are considered on a case-by-case basis. Id. Certain special licenses also are
available for multiple transactions to a range of distributors. Id. With the exception of
U.S. territories and possessions and Canada, most exports require either a validated or
general export license. Id.
43. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (c)(1), (d)(1)-(2) (1988). Section 2404(c)(1), regarding
the "[Commerce] Control [L]ist," provides that:
(1) The Secretary shall establish and maintain, as part of the control list, a list
of all goods and technology subject to export controls under this section. Such
goods and technology shall be clearly identified as being subject to controls
under this section.
Id.
Section 2404(d), regarding "militarily critical technologies," provides:
(1) The Secretary [of Commerce], in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
shall review and revise the list established pursuant to subsection (c), . . . for
the purpose of insuring that export controls imposed under this section cover
and (to the maximum extent consistent with the purposes of this Act) are limited to militarily critical goods and technologies and the mechanisms through
which such goods and technologies may be effectively transferred.
(2) The Secretary of Defense shall bear primary responsibility for developing a
list of militarily critical technologies. In developing such list, primary emphasis
shall be given to (A) arrays of design and manufacturing know-how,
(B) keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment,
(C) goods accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or maintenance know-how, and
(D) keystone equipment which would reveal or give insight into the design
and manufacture of a United States military system, which are not possessed
by, or available in fact from sources outside the United States to, controlled
countries and which, if exported. would permit a significant advance in a
military system or any such country.
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the Munitions List,"4 that contains products with specific military applications such as artillery and guided missiles. 45 The Commerce Department also has a Commerce Control List (CCL), that contains items
having dual uses.46 Items on the CCL are meant for civilian use, but

countries could adapt the high technology components contained within
them for military purposes. 47 The CCL is much more extensive than
the former CoCom Dual-Use List, which has led U.S. businesses to

criticize the CCL as an imposition of unilateral controls.48
The disparity in controls at the national level among different major
exporting countries raises a classical policy debate on which position the
United States should adopt now that the Cold War has ended.49 Proponents of unilateral controls believe the United States should continue to
set the example and work to raise other countries' standards to those of
the United States. On the other hand, critics argue that if proscribed
countries can purchase products from countries other than the United

States, there is no reason to maintain a high level of export control on
those products."
To eliminate restrictions on products available elsewhere, Congress

44. 15 C.F.R. § 770 (Supp. No. 2) (1993).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 799.1 (Supp. No. 1) (1993).
47. See id. (listing examples of dual-use goods as including certain batteries,
cameras, cellular phones and radio technology, crucibles, cylindrical tubing, fingerprint
equipment. live horses, modems, scuba gear, terrain contour mapping equipment, software for protection against viruses, weaving machines, and wind tunnels).
48. See Wrubel, supra note 7, at 248 n.37 (stating that in 1989 there were 214
controlled items, only 124 of which coincided with the former CoCom list). See also
Rasky, supra note 10, at 5 (citing an example where IBM wanted to sell an advanced computer to a Soviet-controlled West-German company). The Defense Department blocked the sale, and the West German company then bought an identical model from the Japanese company, Hitachi. Id.
49. See Rasky, supra note 10, at 5 (noting different approaches that the United
States could take). One approach would involve maintaining a unilateral approach with
the hope that other former Cocom members would conform their export control policies to those presented by the United States. Id. The other, more realistic approach,
involves ending unilateral restrictions on products where foreign availability exists. Id.;
see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 11, at 19-20 (advocating an
end to unilateral controls that have failed to raise other nations to our standards).
50. Rasky, supra note 10, at 5.
51. Rasky, supra note 10, at 5; see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. supra
note 11, at 19-20 (proposing that Congress dispense with unilateral controls that do
not have the prospect of changing the standards in other countries within a short time
period).
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enacted foreign availability provisions52 as part of the EAA and established a monitoring office.53 Contrary to this congressional mandate, the
Commerce Department rarely utilizes foreign availability data to review
the CCL and Munitions List, because the assessment costs are expensive
and contentious.' Furthermore, whenever the President makes a determination to keep certain products on the lists despite foreign availability,
he is required to negotiate with those countries to eliminate the transfer
of that product to proscribed countries.55 Because negotiations could

52. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2404 (f), 2405 (h) (1988). Section 2404 (f)(1)(A) provides:
(A) The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other
appropriate Government agencies and with appropriate technical advisory committees established pursuant to subsection (h) of this section, shall review, on a
continuing basis, the availability to controlled countries, from sources outside
the United States, including countries which participate with the United States
in multilateral export controls, of any goods or technology the export of which
requires a validated license under this section. In any case in which the Secretary determines, in accordance with procedures and criteria which the Secretary
shall by regulation establish, that any such goods or technology are available in
fact to controlled countries from such sources in sufficient quantity and of comparable quality so that the requirement of a validated license for the export of
such goods or technology is or would be ineffective in achieving the purpose
set forth in subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary may not, after the
determination is made, require a validated license for the export of such goods
or technology during the period of such foreign availability, unless the President
determines that the absence of export controls under this section on the goods
or technology would prove detrimental to the national security of the United
States.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)(1)(A) (1988).
53. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)(6) (1988). The Office of Foreign Availability is
responsible for collecting and analyzing all information necessary for the Secretary to
make determinations of foreign availability. Id.
54. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 11, at 172.
55. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f)(4)(A) (1988). This section states:
(A) In any case in which export controls are maintained under this section
notwithstanding foreign availability, on account of a determination by the President that the absence of the controls would prove detrimental to the national
security of the United States, the President shall actively pursue negotiations
with the governments of the appropriate foreign countries for the purpose of
eliminating such availability. No later than the commencement of such negotiations, the President shall notify in writing the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives that he has begun such negotiations and why he believes it is important to national security that export controls on the goods or
technology involved be maintained.
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last indefinitely, foreign availability provisions do not automatically
guarantee an end to unilateral controls. 6
The EAA and the EAR also regulate the export of critical technology
without any guarantee that other countries will control their exports in a
similar manner.5 7 First, as mentioned previously, the EAA allows the
President to institute export controls for foreign policy reasons. 8 Foreign policy controls often result in unilateral sanctions because other
countries will not restrict sales of prohibited items if they disagree with
a particular foreign policy objective. 9 Second, regardless of whether a
56. See Foreign Availability Under the Export Administration Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1989) [hereinafter Foreign Availability
Hearings] (statement of Representative Sam Gejdenson, Chairman of the Subcommittee) (stating that the most notable problems with the foreign availability determinations
are bureaucratic delays and a lack of clear and unambiguous criteria on which to
base a determination). Bureaucratic delays have in some cases resulted from the need
to obtain assessments from the Defense Department. Id. at 10 (statement of Stephen
Hadley, Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, Defense Department). A
seller must file an application for an export license with the Commerce Department.
Id. at 9. If the product in question raises national security issues, however, the Defense, Energy, and State Departments must give assessments before the Commerce
Department grants the license. Id. at 10. This interagency process often results in
delays that the Government could avoid by making one agency responsible for the
entire process. Id. The problem with this recommendation is that the export of sensitive technology is too important to leave to the discretion of one agency. Id. Therefore, a multiagency referral process is necessary to ensure that checks exist to protect
national security interests. Id.
A lack of clear and unambiguous criteria on which to base foreign availability
determinations often has allowed the Defense Department to criticize the Commerce
Department determinations as based on unsound evidence and analysis. Id. at 9. To
avoid arriving at different conclusions, representatives from the Commerce, Defense,
and State Departments have made a greater effort to define common criteria for what
constitutes foreign availability. Id. at 9. Under the EAA, the Commerce Department
has the authority to approve an application for a license even if the Defense
Department determines that the Commerce Department should not grant it. 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2409(f)(1) (1988). The Secretary of Defense can, however, recommend to the
President that he deny the export of a certain good or technology. Id. § 2409(g)(1).
The President then becomes the final arbiter of the dispute between the Commerce
and Defense Departments. Id. § 2409(g)(2).
57. Foreign Availability Hearings, supra note 56, at 9.
58. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a) (1988); see supra note 41 (providing authority for
export controls based on foreign policy considerations).
59. See EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 8 (statement of Dr. Paul
Freedenberg) (recounting the damage foreign policy controls had on a U.S. machine
tool company following sanctions levied in 1979 on the Kama River truck plant lo-
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good or technology is prohibited from export, under the EAR, exporters
must apply for a license if they know that an end user to whom they
are exporting is involved with a biological, chemical, missile, or nuclear
program. ° Third, where products or technology listed on the CCL originated in the United States, the EAA restricts reexport by any foreign
company situated in countries not formerly members of CoCom.6" The
EAA coverage is broad because it affects products assembled or partially
made with U.S. components. 62 The reexport provision also requires ex-

cated in the former Soviet Union). Because of the inability to supply spare parts or
service their machines, the U.S. company became known as an unreliable supplier in
a market it previously had dominated. Id. Even without hope of changing a targeted
country's behavior, removal of a unilateral foreign policy sanction is next to impossible under current law, because it signals a weakened commitment towards changing
the wrongful practices of the target government. Id. (testimony of Boyd J. McKelvain,
National Foreign Trade Council Representative, in response to questioning by Senator
Sasser, Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy);
Report by the President's Export Council Subcommittee on Export Administration,
Nov. 24, 1993, at 2 (discussing the distancing effect of export controls and expressing
concern for costs incurred by U.S. businesses). But see id., at 4 (statement of Dr.
Thomas H. Karas, Senior Associate of International Security Commerce Program,
Office of Technology Assessment) (arguing that maintaining foreign policy controls allows the Executive Branch flexibility for unforeseen circumstances where the Government may want to act but could not if EAA legislation prohibited it).
60. See EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 6 (statement of Dr. Thomas H.
Karas) (explaining that it does not seem unreasonable for an exporter who discovers
this knowledge to pass it on to the United States Government). Most firms prefer not
to contribute to the pursuit of mass-destruction weapons. Id. Moreover, industry concerns of unfairness are exaggerated in that the Commerce Department has not penalized any firm for failure to comply with this regulation and the costs of compliance
are negligible. Id. But see id. (statement of Christopher A. Padilla) (arguing that the
"know or is informed" rule improperly shifts the burden of intelligence gathering from
the government to exporters).
61. 15 C.F.R. § 774.1 (1993). The U.S. reexport policy has generated animosity
from other CoCom members who view it as extraterritorial in nature. Wrubel, supra
note 7, at 251. Adversity to reexport controls arises most frequently in connection
with unilateral U.S. foreign policy objectives and when complex application takes
place involving rules for components, parts, and technical data. NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, supra note 11, at 173.
62. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(m) (1988). This provision provides:
Export controls may not be imposed under this section, or under any other
provision of law, on a good solely on the basis that the good contains parts or
components subject to export controls under this section if such parts or components (1) are essential to the functioning of the good,
(2) are customarily included in sales of the good in countries other than
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porters located in former CoCom nations to apply to the Commerce
Department for a reexport license before reexporting products to former
non-CoCom countries.' Finally, the EAA provisions apply to foreign
subsidiaries controlled by U.S. companies, regardless of whether the
products originated in the United States.'
Although broad, the extraterritorial scope of EAA does not reach to
technological developments made by foreign companies located in foreign countries.65 Theoretically, the EAA does not place reexport controls on companies in countries with adequate export control systems.'
The C6mmerce Department has interpreted "adequate export control system" strictly, however, and despite pressure for a license-free zone by
former CoCom members, it still requires the licensing of exports to
almost every country.67

controlled countries, and
(3) comprise 25 percent or less of the total value of the good, unless the
good itself, if exported, would by virtue of the functional characteristics of
the good as a whole make a significant contribution to the military potential
of a controlled country which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.
Id.

63. 15 C.F.R. § 774.2 (1993); see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra
note 11, at 66, 173 (stating that the United States is the only former CoCom country
that requires permission for the reexport of goods and technology from former CoCom
member countries where the goods were originally exported from the United States).
64. Kelly, supra note 3, at 200.
65. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(a)(5)(A) (granting no authority to regulate goods
or technology where American components or services comprise less than 25% of
total value).
66. Kelly, supra note 3, at 200.
67. See Plousadis. supra note 9, at 584, 588 (stating that the Commerce Department has opposed eliminating licenses to former CoCom members, because it would
lose a check on a good's initial export and a method of tracing goods thereafter).
Arguments in favor of creating a license-free zone include that the number of applications for exports to CoCom countries approaches 25,000 per year and dispensing with
these applications would ease significantly the burden on export control officials. Id.
at 587-88. Furthermore, if members created a license-free zone within CoCom, U.S.
exporters still would be required to give notice to the Secretary, and should a situation arise in which the Secretary believes a license requirement is warranted, § 106(b)
of H.R. 3231 gives the Secretary the discretion to require one. Id.
But see id. at 584 (discussing the position of the opponents to a license-free
zone). Opponents argue that without licenses the number of violatiohs would increase.
Id. The existence of a licensing process ensures compliance with export control regulations because manufacturers of prohibited goods and technology will not attempt to
apply for a license. Id. Moreover, the licensing process is essential to initiating a
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III. THE DISPARATE IMPACT ON U.S. BUSINESSES
Although CoCom managed to curb the flow of sensitive technology to
proscribed countries,6 8 it had minimal success in harmonizing export
control enforcement among member nations. 69 CoCom's failure to harmonize export control enforcement occurred primarily because of differing philosophies between the United States and former CoCom members.7" The United States adopted the position at that time that trade
with the Soviet ,Union was concessionary7 ' and that it should manipulate international commerce to advance foreign policy goals.7 Under
the U.S. rationale, export controls were an effective way to limit the
economic development of the former Soviet Union.73 Japan and the
Western European countries, however, established an economically beneficial relationship with the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.74
The leaders of these countries believed that the domestic restrictions of
the United States were an overreaction to the perceived communist
threat.75 Furthermore, they viewed restrictions on many dual-use prod-

paper trail that would track efforts at diversion. Id.
68. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (describing the success CoCom
had in preventing the flow of sensitive goods and technology).
69. Davis, supra note 32, at 547. See Wrubel, supra note 7, at 253 (stating
CoCom enforcement measures did not successfully stop the flow of sensitive technology to former communist countries).
70. Kevin F. Quigley and William J. Long, Export Controls: Moving Beyond
Economic Containment, WORLD POL'Y J. 165 (Winter 1990), reprinted in The
Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act: Hearings and Markup Before the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs and its Subcomms. on Arms Control, International
Security and Science, and International Economic Policy and Trade, 101st Cong., 2nd
Sess. 77-99 (1990). Whereas the United States viewed CoCom restrictions as a tool of
containment, the West German Government viewed it as a means of stabilizing an
East-West relationship. Id. at 83. Like the United States, West Germany supported
restrictions on the flow of sensitive technology to the former communist countries but
they interpreted those restrictions liberally. Id.
71. See id. (stating that the United States used trade leverage to contain communism); Davis. supra note 32, at 547 (indicating that a concessionary trade policy is
characterized by a willingness to modify trade policy abruptly to achieve foreign
policy goals).
72. Davis, supra note 32, at 547.
73. Davis, supra note 32, at 547.
74. Davis, supra note 32, at 548.
75. See Plousadis, supra note 9, at 577 (stating that former CoCom members
generally had a more relaxed attitude towards export controls than did the United
States).
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ucts as unreasonable because end use most often remained civilian. 6
Moreover, under a cost-benefit analysis, many U.S. restrictions created
significant costs in terms of foregone business opportunities while pro-

ducing relatively minor national security benefits."
Three case studies of export control violations-the Toshiba Machine

Company's78 computerized milling machines sale,

9

the Cyril Bath

contract,"0

Company's lost
and the sale of advanced technology to
Iraq"-demonstrate that export control systems in Western Europe and
Japan historically have been much weaker than those established by the
United States. Unless the regime succeeding CoCom and the new EAA
make progress on obtaining multilateral controls or eliminate unilateral
controls altogether, U.S: businesses will continue to operate under a
more stringent export control system and, therefore, compete at a disadvantage.
A. TOSHIBA MACHINE COMPANY'S SALE TO THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION

In the 1987 Toshiba case, Toshiba Machine Company of Japan
(Toshiba) sold computerized milling machines to the Soviet Union. 2
The Soviet Union allegedly purchased the machines for the rough milling of ship propellers but, instead, the machines enabled the Soviets to

76. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (providing an example of diverging
views on dual-use goods).
77. Frank Gaffney, German Profits Uber [Over] Allies, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 4,
1990, at Cl (criticizing the German Government's subordination of export control
principles to the promotion of business and money making).
78. See Wrubel, supra note 7, at 254 n.74 (describing the Toshiba Machine
Company as a subsidiary of Toshiba Corporation). Toshiba sells products ranging from
televisions and video cassette recorders to nuclear power plant equipment. Id. It employs more than 120,000 employees, is valued at more than $17.5 billion, and is the
largest electronic conglomerate in Japan. Id.
79. See Crawford, supra note 20, at 264-78 (discussing Toshiba's illegal technology sale to the former Soviet Union); Wrubel, supra note 7, at 253-57 (providing factual background to the Toshiba-Kongsberg incident); Gregory, supra note 26. at 86467 (discussing the Toshiba incident).
80. See Wrubel, supra note 7, at 252 n.62 (detailing the Cyril Bath case); infra
notes 98-106 (describing the loss of a sale to a French company due to different
levels of domestic enforcement of CoCom regulations).
81. See generally TIMMERMAN, supra note 22 (describing the contributions of
various governments to Iraq's military development).
82. Crawford, supra note 20, at 266.

AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 9:2

improve the ability of their nuclear submarines to evade radar.8 3 When
coupled with advanced computer equipment purchased from Norway's
Kongsberg Trading Company, 8' the machines made the Soviet submarines quieter." The export to the Soviet Union of both products violated CoCom regulations and cost the United States millions of dollars in
strategic military advantage. 6
To a large extent, Toshiba is responsible for the violation of CoCom
regulations because it misrepresented the products sold to obtain an
export license.87 Nevertheless, no official in Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) questioned the transaction.88 In part,
this oversight was due to the large volume of applications processed in
proportion to the number of export control employees. 9 After the incident, Japan increased the number of export officials in MITI to ameliorate this problem.'

83. Crawford, supra note 20, at 267.
84. See Toshiba Sanctions Expire, DEFENSE NEWS, Jan. 13, 1992, at 2, available
in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File (finding that Kongsberg Trading Co. of
Tokyo is the subsidiary of Kongsberg Vaaperfabrikk of Norway). Sanctions imposed
by the Japanese Government affected both the parent and the subsidiary. Id.
85. Crawford, supra note 20, at 267.
86. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 184 n.11 (citing a Defense Department estimate
that it would cost one billion dollars for new electronic techniques capable of tracking
the quieter submarines, citing an estimate by Representative Hunter of the House
Armed Services Committee that R&D would cost $30 billion to regain previously
held advantages in submarine technology, and noting that the House Armed Services
Committee added $113 million for advanced submarine R&D to the 1987 defense
budget in response to the Toshiba-Kongsberg sales).
87. Gregory, supra note 26, at 865 (stating that the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) granted the export permit under the assumption
that the export of the TDP 70/110, an item not in violation of CoCom regulations,
was the actual item that the exporter would deliver).
88. Gregory, supra note 26, at 865; see Crawford, supra note 20, at 267 (finding
that Japan's export control system at the time of the sale, relied heavily on "selfregulation," which meant that the Government expected the firms not to export products that were on the national list of embargoed goods). MITI officials had a mandate
to nurture Japanese industries and not to restrict exports. Id. In addition, the Trade
Administration Bureau, which was in charge of overseeing export controls, was understaffed. Id. Moreover, MITI officials did not have access to the kind of expertise
needed to consider competently whether products had military applications. Id. In sum.
the combination of these factors rarely, if ever, led Japanese officials to question a
company's decision to export a product, believing instead that the company would
police itself. Id.
89. Crawford, supra note 20, at 267.
90. Wrubel, supra note 7, at 260, 260 n. 111.
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A small-sized export control staff was not the only problem with
MITI's export control program. For example, due to a lack of domestic
enforcement, few incentives existed to encourage companies to abide by
the systemY' In the aftermath of the Toshiba incident, the Japanese
parliament approved legislation that increased penalties for export violations.92 Additionally, the parliament sent a strong message to any company contemplating future violations by barring Toshiba from trading
with former communist countries for one year.93 Similar to the actions
by the Japanese Government, the Norwegian Government took swift
action against the Kongsberg Trading Company. It closed down the
Kongsberg Trading Company and prosecuted the manager of the compa-

ny for providing false information to licensing officials.' Moreover, the
Government of Norway passed more stringent export control legislation
providing for random internal checks, increased penalties, and a greater
number of export control officials.9" Although the reactions of both the
Japanese and Norwegian Governments were commendable, they came
too late to stop a substantial weakening of NATO security.96 In making
changes to their export control programs, these Governments responded

only after international pressure from other CoCom members.97 Accordingly, the illegal sale of milling machines by Toshiba and the sale of

advanced computer equipment by Kongsberg Trading Company to the
Soviet Union illustrates Japan's and Norway's failure to control the

91. Crawford, supra note 20, at 268 (stating that MITI's ability and willingness
to police sales are limited, and that Toshiba had little reason to believe that MITI
would discover and prosecute the illicit transaction).
92. Crawford, supra note 20, at 274.
93. Crawford, supra note 20, at 268. See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER Er
AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED

(2d ed. 1990) (discussing the implementa-

tion and effectiveness of sanctions).
94. Wrubel, supra note 7, at 258.
95. See Wrubel, supra note 7, at 258 (stating that the Norwegian Government
proposed new laws that would increase the number of licensing personnel by 50%).
96. See Crawford, supra note 20, 'at 265 (stating that the Reagan administration
blamed Toshiba's sale for undercutting America's Anti-Submarine Warfare advances
and threatening the security of the West at sea); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the estimated loss of advanced technology).
97. See Crawford, supra note 20, at 273 (discussing negotiating strategies used to
get Japan to tighten its export controls). Congressional leaders also talked of tough
sanctions and symbolically smashed a radio made by Toshiba on the Capitol steps. Id.
at 265. The reactionary nature of Japan's imposition of a one-year ban on exports
made by Toshiba was confirmed when the Japanese lifted the ban on products to
China and imposed a mere $15,000 fine. Id.
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distribution of strategic goods and technology.
B. CYRIL BATH'S LOST CONTRACT
In the 1979 Cyril Bath case, the Cyril Bath Company of Cleveland,
Ohio (Cyril Bath) won one out of ten contracts to supply metal-forming
presses to the Soviet Union.98 A French company, ACB-Loire, received
the other nine contracts. 9 Because the Soviets could use the metalforming presses to manufacture airplane wings, the United States denied
Cyril Bath its application for an export license."° Cyril Bath
demonstrated foreign availability of the presses by French manufacturers
under the other nine contracts and won a reversal.' In compliance
with CoCom regulations, the United States submitted an exception request to CoCom for approval of the sale."° CoCom denied the exception because the French would not admit to selling comparable presses
to the Soviets. 3 CoCom initiated an investigation leading to the discovery that the French had supplied the Soviets with comparable machines."l By the time that CoCom approved the sale by Cyril Bath,
nearly three years had passed and the Soviets already had acquired
French presses.0 5 Cyril Bath, therefore, lost the sale, and ACB-Loire
and the French Government benefitted.'"

98. Maxwell Glen, Exporting Technology-Can Trade and National Security Coexist?, NAT'L J., Aug. 18. 1979, at 1370, 1374.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see Wrubel, supra note 7, at 252 n.62 (indicating that the metal-forming
presses were of military significance to the former Soviet Union's aeronautics industry).
101. Glen, supra note 98, at 1374: Russia's Secret Weapon: U.S. Technology, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1980, at 51, 52; Wrubel, supra note 7, at 252 n.62.
102. Glen, supra note 98, at 1374; Wrubel, supra note 7, at 252 n.62.
103. Wrubel, supra note 7, at 252 n.62; see Glen, supra note 98, at 1374 (stating
that the French denied that the metal-forming presses were designed to produce airplane wings).
104. Glen, supra note 98, at 1374; see Wrubel, supra note 7, at 252 n.62 (stating
that the French had made the sales without seeking CoCom approval).
105. Russia's Secret Weapon: U.S. Technology, supra note 101, at 52; Glen, supra
note 98, at 1374.
106. See Wrubel. supra note 7, at 252 n.62 (stating that French disregard for
CoCom controls resulted in member annoyance with CoCom procedures and the loss
of a sale to a U.S. business).
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IRAQ ACQUIRES ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

Recent events in the Middle East represent another example of export
control failure. In the Persian Gulf War, U.S. soldiers fought against
military technology manufactured by Western nations."° Allied pilots
bombed facilities housing advanced Western computer equipment. 8
Allied troops also faced biological, chemical, and conventional weapons
with destructive capabilities enhanced by Western technology."
Although U.S. companies assisted Iraq's development of military technology,"' French and West German companies supplied the most

107. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing products sold by the
French to Iraq). Additional products included: broadcasting networks, car assembly
plants. defense electronics factories, desalinization plants, fertilizer plants, gas liquefaction complexes, a navy yard, a new airport, petrochemical plants, a subway system.
and telecommunications systems. TIMMERMAN, supra note 22, at 32. The United
States also contributed to the military development of Iraq through supplies of biological viruses, gas-turbined engines, navigational radar, and sophisticated computers.
Gloria Borger, et al., When the Enemy Is Us, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 18,
1991. at 36. Hewlett Packard sold computers to Iraq, and Lummus Crest, a New
Jersey finm, built a petrochemical plant that it claims cannot be used to manufacture
weapons. Id. at 37.
108. Gloria Borger et al., supra note 107, at 36.
109. Id. See Igor Reichlin et al., Iraq's Silent Allies in its Quest for the Bomb,
Bus. WK., Jan. 14, 1991, at 50 (warning of Iraq's determination to acquire Western
technology for nuclear bombs as well as biological, chemical, and conventional weapons). Iraq acquired 40 pounds of weapons-grade uranium from France and the former
Soviet Union. Id. Iraq also has crude detonators. Id. It has acquired more than 350
tons of yellowcake, which is uranium ore milled into a fine powder and pressed into
briquets, from Nigeria and Portugal. Id. To create a nuclear device, Saddam Hussein
must enrich the uranium. Id. He needs an enrichment plant, therefore, which would
mix fluorine with the yellowcake and then send the gaseous mixture through over 100
sophisticated gas centrifuges arranged in cascades. Id. The extremely corrosive mixture
created then is converted into uranium oxide, a metal powder, that further becomes
shaped into a nuclear bomb charge. Id.
The German Government stopped Vereinigte Aluminum Werke, a German company, from exporting large-size aluminum pipes that Saddam Hussein could have uied
in creating an enrichment plant. Id. But authorities discovered that Inwako of Germany supplied ring magnets to stabilize centrifuge rotors; H & H Metalform of Germany delivered numerically controlled lathes to cut specialty steels; Britain's SwiftLevick sold magnets to the Iraqis; and Vecco, a company from Plainview, New York
sold vacuum pumps for a conversion plant. Id. Finally, MAN Technology, a German
company, sold a highly classified design of a centrifuge system. Id. Every transaction
brought Saddam Hussein closer to building a nuclear bomb. Id.
110. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (stating that U.S. and U.K. compa-
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equipment and technical expertise."' French and West German enterprises sold high technology equipment and plans to Iraq for biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons projects."' The West German Government implicitly supported the actions of its companies through weak enforcement of existing restrictions.'
These three examples demonstrate that the French, Japanese, and West
German Governments have been slow to bring charges against violators
of CoCom restrictions and have imposed only nominal penalties on
those guilty of violating national export legislation." 4 This history of
permissive export controls and weak enforcement by some CoCom nations lends credibility to concerns that leaving export control to national

nies aided in Iraqi development, but their participation did not reflect an overall pattern of weak export control enforcement).
111. Gaffney, supra note 77, at Cl. The Germans are responsible for at least
three major projects that jeopardized global security. Id. The first involves Pilot Plant,
a German corporation, which sold Hussein two laboratories for chemical weapons
production. Id. The second implicates H & H Metalform, which allegedly sold Iraq
the technology that enabled the country to build enrichment plants for weapons-grade
uranium. Id.; see supra note 109 and accompanying text (describing the H & H
Metalform product sold). The final project resulted in the sale of uranium in various
forms by a company named Nukem. Gaffney, supra note 77, at Cl. See also supra
notes 22 and 107 (discussing the French contribution to Iraqi development). The
French also signed a Franco-Iraqi Nuclear Cooperation Treaty with Iraq, which committed the French Government to training 600 nuclear technicians from Iraq.
TIMMERMAN, supra note 22, at 33.
112. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text (discussing the French and
German contributions to Iraqi military development).
113. See Reichlin et al., supra note 109, at 51 (supporting a general feeling that
although it is true that U.S. and U.K. companies were guilty of contributing to the
buildup in Iraq, the failure of export enforcement in Germany represents a greater
pattern of relaxed attitude to enforcement of CoCom regulations and domestic export
controls). Id. German export officials admit that their department was a sieve for
determined operators. Id. The 80 bureaucrats that worked at the Federal Export Office
often sided with German businesses. Id. The feeling was that export officials should
construe any doubtful transactions for the benefit of business interests over national
security. Id.
114. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that the Japanese Government initially imposed swift and serious action against Toshiba by preventing it from
trading with communist countries for one year but later lifted the ban and imposed a
mere $15,000 fine); Wrubel, supra note 7, at 252 n.62 (stating that the French refused to admit that their companies violated CoCom prohibitions on metal-forming
.presses even after a U.S. investigation had proven foreign availability); see also supra
note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of strong enforcement by the
German Export Control Department).
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discretion will result in a competitive disadvantage for U.S. businesses.1

5

IV. THE NEW REGIME-COCOM'S SUCCESSOR
Whether U.S. businesses will continue to compete at a competitive
disadvantage depends, in part, on the successor organization to CoCom.

CoCom's successor will not target any static group of countries but
instead will focus on preventing the acquisition of certain products that
aid in military development." 6 This new regime will rely primarily on

national discretion to achieve its goals." 7 National discretion allows
each member country to implement its own export control system to
meet the new regime's rules. Most likely, the new regime will operate

in a manner similar to the Australia Group and the Missile Technology
Control Regime."' Like ,CoCom, these organizations operate on
gentlemen's agreements and have a list of proscribed goods and technologies." 9
Unlike CoCom, however, there will not be a regular meeting schedule, an established secretariat, a prenotification requirement, 20 or veto
power.' 2 ' Thus, without veto power, the United States will lack the
means to block the export of goods or technology to countries in violation of the new regime's rules."2 Also, unlike CoCom, its successor
will operate informally and lack tight rules concerning licensing procedures.Y Therefore, the rapidity and efficiency with which a country
processes an export license may determine which companies, foreign
governments and firms select as sellers. 4
115. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (stating that a more stringent export control system in the United States will cause its businesses to lose market share
without stopping the availability of the same products from other sources).
116. International Finance, Clinton Pledges Further Aid to Russia as Yeltsin Vows
Reforms will Continue, Daily Rep. for Executives, Jan. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, ARCNWS File.
117. See Export Controls, supra note 13 (stating that the new regime will focus
on preventing weapons-related proliferation through a modus operandi of national
discretion).
118. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2 (statement of Dr. Paul Freedenberg).
119. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2 (statement of Dr. Paul Freedenberg).
120. See Weymouth, supra note 16, at A19 (explaining that members of the new
regime will no longer have to pre-notify other members before shipping exports).
121. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2 (statement of Dr. Paul Freedenberg).
122. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2 (statement of Dr. Paul Freedenberg).
123. EAA Hearings'1, supra note 13, at 2 (statement of Dr. Paul Freedenberg).
124. See EAA Hearings, supra note 13, at I (statement of Derrel De Passe, Vice
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V. THE NEW EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT
In addition to CoCom's successor, whether the competitiveness of
U.S. businesses will improve depends on changes in domestic export
control legislation. The current EAA will expire in June 1994."z Accordingly, Congress has made the passage of a new EAA a top priority."' Two bills will serve as starting points for the new EAA's development. With support from the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM), 27 Representatives Toby Roth (R-Wis.) and James L. Oberstar
(D-Minn.) have introduced H.R. 3412.28 Senators Donald W. Riegle,
Jr. (D-Mich.) and Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.) have introduced the Clinton
administration's proposal for a new EAA in S. 1902.129

A. THE ROTH/OBERSTAR BILL-H.R. 3412
H.R. 3412 makes several fundamental changes in the export of goods
and technology. First, although H.R. 3412 maintains the availability of
unilateral controls, it institutes a six-month sunset provision 3 ' on sanctions, unless the President upgrades the situation to a total economic
embargo, or unless Congress adopts a joint resolution supporting executive action. 3 ' Under the current EAA, the President may institute unilateral controls for foreign policy or national security reasons without
defining a fixed time for recision."3 In support of a strict time limit
President of Varian Associates, Inc.) (stating that bureaucratic delays in the licensing
process turn foreign buyers away from U.S. suppliers and discourage small- to medium-sized businesses from exporting their products).
125. EAA Hearings, supra note 13, at 1 (opening statement of Jim Sasser, Chairman of the Senate Banking Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary
Policy).
126. EAA Hearings, supra note 13 (opening statement of Jim Sasser).
127. See EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13. at 2 (statement of Christopher A.
Padilla) (stating that H.R. 3412 embodies a proposal fashioned by industry); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, MANUFACTURING LEADS THE WAY 4 (on file
with The American University Journal of International Law and Policy) (defining
NAM as the representative for more than 12,000 member companies that comprises
85% of the American manufacturing industry).
128. H.R. 3412. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
129. S. 1902, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
130. H.R. 3412 § 5(a), at 47; see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note
11, at 360 (defining "sunset provision" as "a clause mandating the periodic review
and automatic termination of an export restriction unless its continued inclusion on a
control list has been rejustified and agreed upon").
131. H.R. 3412 § 5(b), at 54-63.
132. See supra notes 41, 58-59 and accompanying text (citing the authority for
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on unilateral controls, U.S. industries argue that their proposal maintains
executive discretion while encouraging the Government to seek multilateral agreement. 33 In the event that the United States cannot obtain
multilateral agreement on economic sanctions, this provision ensures that
businesses will not have to compete at a disadvantage for longer than
180 days, unless one of the two statutory exceptions is met.'
Critics of the sunset provision note that at certain times the United
States may wish to prevent the export of a good or tachnology regardless of the position of other countries. 35 Sunset provisions deny
the President flexibility and discretionary power that these unforeseen
occasions may require.'36 Additionally, critics assert that reducing foreign availability may take longer than six months. 37 Placing a sixmonth limit on unilateral controls forces the President to give up pursuing multilateral controls instead of allotting more time to persuade
other countries to adopt similar sanctions. 3
Second, H.R. 3412 creates a license-free zone among new regime
members.'39 Under this system, exporters would not need a license for
dual-use goods and technology exported to members of the new regime. 40 Supporters of a license-free zone assert that requiring export
licenses for these products unnecessarily burdens exporters, consumes
Commerce Department resources that are better .allocated elsewhere, and
does little to create goodwill among countries with adequate export
control programs. 4 ' Critics of this provision prefer the current process, however, because the existence of a system prevents certain companies from cheating.'42 They note that the Commerce Department re-

foreign policy and national security controls and discussing the implementation of
unilateral sanctions).
133. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 4-5 (statement of Christopher A. Padilla).
134. H.R. 3412 § 5(a)(2)(A), at 47.
135. EAA Hearings 1. supra note 13. at 4 (statement of Dr. Thomas H. Karas).
136. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2-3 (statement of Dr. Thomas H. Karas).
137. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 4 (statement of Dr. Thomas H. Karas).
138. See EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13 (statement of Dr. Thomas H. Karas)
(explaining that success in obtaining multilateral controls comes slowly sometimes and
efforts to keep trying, rather than quit entirely, are appropriate).
139. H.R. 3412 § 4(d), at 39-45.
140. Id.
141. Plousadis, supra note 9, at 588; see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra
note 11, at 120-22 (discussing the movement of the European Community to a license-free zone and recommending its adoption among former CoCom partners).
142. EAA Hearings 1. supra note 13, at 5 (testimony of Henry D. Sokolski) (responding to a question on the utility of export control paperwork posed by Chairman
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ceives most of its diverted product and tracking information from license
applications.143 Without license applications, critics argue that more
companies will cheat and the Commerce Department will lose control
over exported products."4
H.R. 3412 also provides for a reduction in the Dual-Use List of prohibited exports and instead focuses on preventing the sale of choke-point
technologies. 145 Choke-point technologies are products essential to the
proliferation of missile delivery systems or weapons of mass destruction. " Supporters of this provision claim that reducing the Dual-Use
List to essential items will allow countries to build "higher fences
around a smaller yard,"'147 thereby making it more likely that the new
regime will achieve multilateral controls on specific items. 48 In the
process of revising the Dual-Use List, the working group would involve
private industries to a much greater extent than they have in the
past. 49 Private industries would provide helpful insight and serve to
build a consensus for supporting export controls in certain limited areas.'50 Opponents of the bill agree that Congress and the agencies
should shorten the Dual-Use List, provided that they can identify and
stop the transfer of choke-point technologies.'

Sasser by stating that the existence of a system deters some exporters from cheating).
143. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2 (testimony of Henry D. Sokolski).
144. EAA Hearings 1. supra note 13, at 2 (testimony of Henry D. Sokolski) (arguing for an inter-agency referral process to detect objectionable exports and arguing
against a system triggered only by honest disclosure); see supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the role of export licensing documents in creating a paper
trail and discouraging illegal exporting).
145. H.R. 3412 § 4(d), at 39-46: EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13. at 4 (statement
of Christopher A. Padilla) (predicting that the negotiations under CoCom's successor
will lead to a shorter list of multilateral controls).
146. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 7 (statement of Dr. Paul Freedenberg).
147. Fabio Del Bergiolo. Reshape CoCom for the '90's: Unified Internal Rules
Can Guide Policies on Exports, DEF. NEWS, Nov. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS.
NEWS Library, ARCNWS File; Go Slowly with CoCom Changes, DEF. NEWS, June
4, 1990, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS File.
148. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 4 (statement of Christopher A. Padilla)
(asserting that international negotiations will lead to a consensus on a "short-list" of
choke-point goods and technologies).
149. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 11, at 174.
150. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 11, at 174.
151. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2 (statement of Henry D. Sokolski) (asserting that the use of sophisticated transshipment schemes for dual-use items makes it
difficult to guard against the transfer of choke-point technologies without increasing
the number of checks within the system).
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The fourth major change H.R. 3412 proposes to the current EAA is
judicial review of agency action.'52 Under the current EAA, Commerce
Department decisions regarding export license approval or denial are
final because they are exempted from the Administrative Procedure
Act's (APA) judicial review provision.' Critics of the current system
argue that although there are strong arguments in favor of the exemption'54 such as administrative efficiency and limitations on financial
resources, disallowing judicial review compromises fairness and inhibits
change.'55 They feel, therefore, that Congress should implement limited
judicial review as a check on agency behavior out of fairness to individual exporters whose applications for an export license are denied by
the Commerce Department.'56 Supporters of the current exemption,
however, state that judicial review is costly 57 and unnecessary in light
of the small number of licenses that the Commerce Department denies. 5 Moreover, they assert that the Executive Branch must maintain
152. H.R. 3412 § 8(c), at 108-12.
153. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412 (1988). Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review
provides:
(a) Exemption
Except as provided in section 11(c)(2) and subsection (c) of this section, the
functions exercised under this Act are excluded from the operation of sections
551, 553 through 559, and 701 through 706 of title 5, United States Code.

(b), (c) & (d) [Omitted]
(e) A determination of the Secretary, under section 10(f) of this Act, to deny a
license may be appealed by the applicant to an administrative law judge who
shall have the authority to conduct proceedings to determine only whether the
item sought to be exported is in fact on the control list. Such proceedings shall
be conducted within 90 days after the appeal is filed. Any determination by an
administrative law judge under this subsection and all materials, filed before
such judge in the proceedings shall be reviewed by the Secretary, who shall
either affirm or vacate the determination in a written decision within 30 days
after receiving the determination. The Secretary's written decision shall be final
and is not subject to judicial review. Subject to the limitations provided in
section 12(c) of this Act, the Secretary's decision shall be published in the
Federal Register.
Id.

154. See ARTHUR EARL. BONFIELD & MICHAEL AsIMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 594-97 (1989) (discussing the benefits and detriments of judicial review).
155. Id.
156. Franklin D. Cordell for John L. Ellicott, Judicial Review Under the Export
Administration Act of 1979: Is it Time to Open the Courthouse Doors to U.S. Exporters?, reprinted in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 11, at 321-35.
157. Id. at 327.
158. See EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 9, 13 (statement of Dr. Thomas H.
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discretion over all export applications for foreign policy and national
security reasons. 9
H.R. 3412 also proposes streamlining the licensing process and centralizing agency review under the Commerce Department. Under the
current system it is common for licensing evaluations to take from three
to five months."W The bill supported by NAM reduces the time for
license evaluation to thirty days.' According to one expert, this time
limit is not unreasonable if agencies would conduct simultaneous reviews of the license application by computer.' H.R. 3412 also proposes centralizing the day-to-day license application operations under the
Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration (BXA). 63
The NAM believes that consolidating the review of license applications
in one agency will increase efficiency without compromising security- 4 To ensure that the Commerce Department takes the other agencies' concerns into consideration, H.R. 3412 proposes a policy setting
and dispute resolution board comprised of officials from the Commerce,
Defense, Energy, and State Departments.6 Critics of agency consolidation, however, state that there is no way to ensure that the Commerce
Department takes each agency's concerns into account without having all
interested Departments involved in the process of review.'66 Moreover,
as the interdependency among defense, energy, environment, technology,
and trade increases, more agencies, not fewer, will have valid concerns
about the evaluation of licenses.'67 One expert, however, has noted that
the existence of more agencies in the review process does not necessari-

Karas) (stating that export license denials do not have a significant impact on the
total export picture and providing a graph depicting a decline in denials of export
licenses since 1989).
159. Cordell. supra note 156, at 327-29.
160. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 11, at 93.
161. H.R. 3412 § 7(c), at 92-98.
162. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 9 (statement of Henry D. Sokolski).
163. H.R. 3412 § 6(a), at 63-68.
164. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 6-7 (statement of Christopher A. Padilla);
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 11, at 190-91.
165. H.R. 3412 § 6(b), at 68-70.
166. Interview with an Officer of the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs of
the State Department. Washington, D.C. (Jan. 20, 1994).
167. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 7-10 (statement of Henry D. Sokolski)
(suggesting that as proliferators rely on more complex schemes of transshipment more
interagency referral is necessary to prevent the spread of chemical and nuclear weapons).

-- A--
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ly have to result in a longer processing time.'68 State-of-the-art computers, simultaneous agency review, and fewer intermediate meetings
will satisfy both security concerns and business interests.'69
B. THE ADMINISTRATION'S BILL-S. 1902
The Commerce, Defense, and State Departments are united behind the
Clinton administration's proposal for the new EAA.'70 The
administration's bill maintains the availability of unilateral controls but
subjects them to a new discipline.' Before implementing unilateral
controls, this bill requires the Secretary of Commerce to conduct an economic cost/benefit analysis on the proposed controls.' To further the
new discipline, this bill also requires an annual review of each item
controlled. as well as a report to Congress specifying the purpose
168. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2 (statement of Henry D. Sokolski).
169. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2 (statement of Henry D. Sokolski).
170. See EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 1 (opening statement of Senator Jim
Sasser, Subcommittee Chairman) (commending the administration for presenting a
unified position on the proposed EAA). But see Weymouth, supra note 16, at A19
(indicating that there is a difference of opinion among agency officials over dual-use
controls, and criticizing Secretary of Defense William Perry for favoring rapid decontrol of dual-use goods and technologies).
171. EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 7 (statement of Barry Carter); id. at 6-7
(statement of Lynn Davis, Undersecretary for International Security Affairs, Department of State) (defending the" availability of unilateral controls to respond to situations
of terrorism, human right abuses, and regional instability).
172. EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 7; S. 1902 § 5(b), at 28-32. In evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of proposed unilateral controls the President
must consider the following statutory criteria:
1) compatibility with overall United States foreign policy objectives toward the target country, 2) the likely reactions of other nations, 3) foreign policy gains to be realized, 4) economic costs to be incurred, 5) the
likelihood of changing the behavior of the target country, 6) the ability
to deny access by the target country to the controlled items, and 7) the
likelihood of establishing multilateral cooperation.
EAA Hearings 2. supra note 12, at 7 (statement of Barry Carter).
173. S. 1902 § 5(a)(5), at 28; EAA Hearings 2. supra note 12, at 8 (statement' of
Barry Carter). In conducting the annual review, the President will only renew or extend unilateral export controls if they are likely to continue to:
make substantial progress toward achieving the intended purpose of 1) changing,
modifying, or constraining the undesirable conduct or policies of the target
country or countries, 2) denying the target country access to controlled items
from all sources, 3) substantially assisting efforts to achieve multilateral cooperation to deny the target country unconstrained access to controlled items, or 4)
promoting the foreign policy purpose of avoiding actions that significantly and
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for each export control. 74 In the event that an export control does not
meet the statutorily imposed criteria, the bill calls for elimination of that
control.'7 5 Finally, the bill requires publication of all controls in the
Federal Register.'76 The administration claims that the above requirements create an effects test that will eliminate ineffective controls, and
will preclude controls whose only purpose is to express disapproval by
the United States of another country's actions or policies.'77
Like H.R. 3412, the administration's version of the EAA streamlines
the export licensing system, increases the transparency of the process,
and concentrates on preventing the flow of choke-point technology.'
It does not, however, create a license-free zone among new regime
members.'79 Moreover, whereas H.R. 3412 limits the export licensing
process to thirty days, 8' the administration's proposal allows for a
maximum of ninety days.'8 ' In addition to decreasing the license evaluation period, the administration's bill also establishes conflict resolution
procedures with stringent time limits.' 2 If agencies differ over the
evaluation of a license application referred to them by the Commerce
Department, S. 1902 first provides for an interagency committee selected
by the Secretary of Commerce to attempt to resolve the dispute.'83 In
the event that the committee cannot find a solution, they must refer the
matter to the President no later than ninety days following the initial
filing. '

directly support the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism,
human rights abuses, or regional instability.
EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 8 (statement of Barry Carter).
174. S. 1902 § 5(e), at 33-35.
175. S. 1902 § 5(b), at 28-32.
176. EAA Hearings 2. supra note 12. at 7 (statement of Lynn Davis) (providing
for the identification of unilateral controls by regulation).
177. EAA Hearings 2. supra note 12, at 9 (statement of Barry Carter).
178. See S. 1902 § 3(2)(B), at 13 (restricting "the export of items that would
make a significant contribution to the military potential of countries that would prove
detrimental to the national security and foreign policy of the United States").
179. See generally S. 1902 § 8, at 84-95 (maintaining the license application
process without exception for exports to former CoCom member countries).
180. H.R. 3412 § 7(c), at 92-98.
181. S. 1902 § 8(d), (g), at 89-90, 92-94.
182. EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 12 (statement of Barry Carter) (noting the
administration bill's provision for the escalation of cases in dispute to senior policy
levels).
183. S. 1902 § 8(c)(5), (d), at 88-90.
184. Id. § 8(d), at 89-90.
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Other provisions in the administration's bill address the complexity
and bureaucracy of the export control system." 5 The bill's remedies
include: the creation of a high level policy coordinating committee to
communicate better to officials and exporters the goals of the export
control system;'86 the elimination of unintended overlaps between lists
of prohibited items; 7 the promotion of electronic filing; 8 and the
centralization ofexport control functions within each agency while maintaining separate agency review. 9
The administration's bill stops short of providing the remedy of judicial review for agency decisionmaking. The bill requires the Secretary of
Commerce to establish a procedure whereby an applicant can appeal the
Commerce Department's denial of an export license application or other
agency action."9 If agency action fails to conform to the time limits

established by the statute, the bill allows the applicant to file a petition
with the Secretary of Commerce.'' If, after twenty days, the agency

has not brought the application into conformity, the applicant may bring
an action in district court to compel the agency to abide by the time
limits. 92 In addition to remedies for time limit violations, exporters
also may petition the Secretary of Conimerce if they are unfairly impacted.'93 According to the statute, unfair impact results when foreign
availability exists,'94 or U.S. businesses are either subjected to ineffec-

185. EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 10 (statement of Barry Carter) (asserting
that the administration, business community, and Congress agree that the current export control system is characterized by costly and lengthy processing times).
186. EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 6 (statement of Lynn Davis) (suggesting
comprehensive annual reports as a means of communicating this information).
187. EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 6 (statement of Lynn Davis).
188. EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 6 (statement of Lynn Davis) (stating that
there are now over 100 companies submitting licenses electronically).
189. EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 6 (statement of Lynn Davis) (noting that
the State Department has centralized its functions into one bureau).
190. S. 1902 § 8(h)(1), at 94.
191. Id. § 8(h)(2), at 94.
192. Id. § 8(h)(3). at 94-95.
193. Id. § 5(k), at 48-59. An exporter can petition the Secretary of Commerce on
any one of three bases: foreign availability, ineffective controls, and competitive disadvantage. Id. § 5(k)(2). In addition, the Secretary of Commerce may conduct an evaluation on his own initiative. Id.
194. Id. § 5(k)(2)(A), at 49. Foreign availability is present when, "[t]he controlled
item is available in fact in sufficient quantity and comparable quality to the proposed
countries of export or end users from sources outside the United States so that the
requirement for a validated license is or would be ineffective in achieving the purpose
of the control." Id. See EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 11 (statement of Barry
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tive export controls,' 95 or forced to operate at a competitive disadvan196
tage.
S. 1902 states a clear preference for multilateral export controls and
supports a strong multilateral regime. 97 It also harmonizes
sanctions'98 for the transfer of weapons and strengthens enforcement of
all sanctions."99 Finally, S. 1902 retains the anti-boycott provisions of

Carter) (incorporating the concept of "forward-looking" into foreign availability determinations to keep pace with the rate of technological innovation).
195. S. 1902 § 5(k)(2)(B), at 49. Controls are ineffective when "[t]he controlled
items are so widely available in the United States that the Government cannot enforce
the controls effectively, unless the Secretary has reliable evidence that the controls
have been effective in denying such target destination access to the controlled items
originating in the United States." Id.
196. Id. § 5(k)(2)(C), at 49-50. Companies act at a competitive disadvantage when:
(i) Differences between the export control policies or procedures of the United
States and that of governments of foreign suppliers effectively has placed or
will place the United States exporter at a near-term commercial disadvantage
vis-a-vis its competitors abroad; or
(ii) Changes to the domestic control lists of the United States and foreign governments result in similar items being controlled differently thus resulting in a
competitive disadvantage.
Id.
197. Id. § 3(3)-(7), at 13-15 (advocating in the policy statement section, that the
United States Government and members of CoCom's successor should: focus on items
truly critical to control objectives, increase membership of multilateral regimes, and
harmonize member countries' licensing practices).
198. Id. §§ 12A, 12B, at 137-69. S. 1902 makes sanctions on the sale of prohibited exports more consistent, responsive, and stronger. EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12,
at 15-16 (statement of Barry Carter). The administration's bill:
expand[s] chemical and biological weapons (CBW) activity to include
contributions to any CBW program, not just those of terrorist or rogue
states, to include the knowing provision of services or participation in
financial transactions involving a target program; expand[s] mandatory
sanctions to include export, import and government procurement bans;
expand[s] the sanctionable activity scope to include the knowing provision of services to a target program; expand[s] the consultation provisions of existing law to the missile area; revise[s] the waiver standard to
include the considerations of important U.S. economic interests in proceeding with sanctions; provide[s] for multilateral sanctions to replace
unilateral sanction[s] where the President finds them to be more effective.
Id.
199. S. 1902 §§ 9, 10, at 95-116; EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 15-16
(statement of Barry Carter). S. 1902 strengthens enforcement of export controls by:
providing greater authority for undercover operations; increasing penalties; utilizing for-
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the current EAA 2'
trols.

20 1

and maintains the inclusion of short supply con-

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The new export control regime creates an incentive for countries to
adopt the least restrictive system. Without multilateral controls, it is
unlikely that countries will achieve the goal of slowing or stopping the
proliferation of arms and nuclear weapons. Moreover, in the absence of
multilateral controls, foreign availability will render unilateral controls
ineffective in preventing targeted countries from receiving proscribed
goods and technology." 2 This situation will create pressure for the
United States to reduce its level of export control regulation to that of
the country with the least restrictive system. Such negative harmonization will likely undermine the goals of the new regime. The Clinton
administration, therefore, must insist on multilateral controls to ensure
that the goals of the new regime are met. National discretion alone will
not produce the desired result of effective management over the distribution of sensitive goods and technology.
In formulating the new export control system, Congress must recognize the need to maintain some flexibility to allow for an effective
Executive Branch response to unforeseen situations. H.R. 3412 does not
appear to preserve executive discretion sufficiently. After six months, the
only executive alternative to the "sunsetting" of unilateral controls is the
enactment of a total embargo. 3 H.R. 3412's other alternative, requiring the President to obtain a joint resolution from both houses of Congress, is strictly a legislative prerogative and does not preserve executive

feitures; providing additional inspections, searches, and seizures; and issuing denial

orders. Id.
200. S. 1902 § 7, at 76-84; EAA Hearings 2, supra note 12, at 17 (statement of
Barry Carter).
201. S. 1902 § 6, at 62-76. The President can avail himself of short supply controls to restrict items the export of which would excessively drain the country of
scarce resources. Id. § 3(2)(D). Short supply controls also allow the President to work
to secure the removal of restrictions placed by foreign countries on goods that would
have a serious inflationary impact, cause a serious domestic shortage, or influence the
foreign policy of the United States. Id.
202. EAA Hearings 1, supra note 13, at 2 (statement of Christopher A. Padilla)
(predicting that under an export control system that relies on national discretion, foreign competitors will sell anything to anyone).
203. H.R. 3412 § 5(b), at 54-63.
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discretion.2" On the other hand, S. 1902 may not go far enough in
protecting U.S. business interests, by requiring an annual review, an economic analysis, an effectiveness test, and a periodic report from the
Secretary of Commerce to Congress for each export control. The better
approach is a compromise provision that assures businesses that the
Secretary of Commerce rarely, if ever, will impose unilateral controls.
Although not a provision of S. 1902, a license-free zone among new
regime members would avoid unnecessary paperwork and allow for the
tracking of strategic goods and technology without compromising global
security, only if coupled with a multilateral standard destination control
statement.2 5 Under a license-free zone the number of exporters desiring judicial review would decline. For those cases remaining, an appeals
process within the Commerce Department would suffice. Congress
should not leave national security concerns to the judiciary.2'
A shorter list of prohibited goods and technology is desired by all
interested parties, provided that it succeeds in preventing the flow of
choke-point technologies. Regarding items not on the short list, both
bills recommend that the Clinton administration should make streamlining their application process to non-regime members a goal of the new
EAA. Nevertheless, the process should not become centralized under the
Commerce Department's BXA, because of other agency concerns. To
address the concerns of U.S. industries, Congress should enact stringent
time limits for review and include checks to ensure that the ninety day
allowance under S. 1902, if enacted, does not become the standard time
the Commerce Department takes for processing licenses. Moreover,
Congress should mandate computerization of the licensing process, and
require simultaneous review of all license applications where referral is
necessary.
CONCLUSION
CoCom effectively limited the flow of sensitive military technology to
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, despite weak enforcement
by other countries, and due largely to considerable burdens on U.S.
businesses. 2" Because the Cold War has ended, the Clinton administra-

204. Id.
205. Wrubel, supra note 7, at 271. A standard destination control statement would
replace all shipping documents generated at the national level. Id.
206. Cordell, supra note 156, at 328-29 (discussing the merits of judicial review
for export licensing).
207. See supra notes 70, 77, 113-14 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
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tion and Congress have begun to formulate a new export control strategy, comprised of a new EAA and CoCom's successor."' In drafting
the new EAA, Congress should avoid implementing a system that encourages the use of unilateral -action to prevent proliferation. In addition
to working towards multilateral controls on a shorter list of prohibited
items, Congress and the administration must revamp the domestic export
control system to make it easier for U.S. businesses to sell in other
countries.
If the Clinton administration and Congress are committed to improving the competitiveness of U.S. businesses,2 9 they, should not hinder
exports in their effort to prevent arms and nuclear proliferation."' The
balance between strengthening an economy and ensuring national security is often a delicate one. Finding the correct balance is among the
administration's most difficult and important challenges.

existence of less stringent export control systems adopted by former CoCom allies).
208. See supra Parts PV-V (discussing CoCom's successor and the new EAA).
209. See generally TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 12
(discussing ways to make U.S. businesses more competitive and better exporters);
LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (1992) (advocating Government activism to promote U.S. com-

petitiveness in high technology sectors and recommending the strengthening of multilateral rules governing high technology trade).
210. TYSON, supra note 209, at 54.

